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Background Guide for the Security Council

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Welcome from the Director-General

Dear Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you all to Washington State Model United Nations (WASMUN) 2018. My name is Tyler Lincoln, and I am serving as your Director-General for this year's WASMUN conference. Throughout my time at the University of Washington, I have been able to participate in Model United Nations as a delegate, committee staff, and executive staff, each bringing their own sets of challenges and rewards. I have been working with WASMUN for 3 years now, first serving as committee staff, and last year as the Assistant-Director-General for WASMUN 2017. As Director-General for this year's conference, it has been my goal to continue to increase WASMUN's ability to provide a fun, challenging experience from which all can grow and learn.

The theme of this year's WASMUN conference is building a more sustainable future together. With the conference taking place in the Pacific Northwest, and keeping in mind the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals, this year's WASMUN is focusing on diversity and inclusivity. The wide range of committees chosen for WASMUN this year aims to reflect the importance of sustainable development. Additionally, the diversity of committees aims to show the interlinkages between the social, economic and political pillars of sustainable development. Each of these three dimensions is crucial for promoting the development of all. We hope you keep this in mind as you pursue your own unique solutions to the challenges we provide you.

On a final note, each committee dais worked hard in ensuring they provide you with helpful and useful information through writing the background guides. That being said, I wish you the best of luck in preparing for this conference and I look forward to meeting you all in a couple of months! If you have any questions during your preparation, please don't hesitate to send them to dg@wasmun.org.

Best,

Tyler Lincoln

Director-General

WASMUN 2018

Welcome from the SC Committee Staff

Dear Delegates,

I would like to welcome you to the Security Council (SC) at the 2018 Washington State Model United Nations (WASMUN)! My name is Rohit Chandel and I have the honor of serving as the Director for the SC. I am a 3rd year Mining Engineering student at the University of British Columbia (UBC) in Vancouver. Your Assistant Director, Andrew Dyadin, is also a 3rd year student at UBC, pursuing a B.A. in International Relations.

The topic under discussion for the Council are:

1. Humanitarian Exemptions in Sanctioned Regimes
2. The Situation in Somalia

As one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, the Security Council is mandated by the Charter of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. It is the only body within the UN system with the authority to pass legally binding resolutions. The Council is composed of 15 Member States; 5 of which are permanent members with a Veto and the other 10 are elected by the General Assembly for 2-year terms. As delegates, you must strive to be cooperative and diplomatic as it will ensure an accurate simulation of the Council. The topics this year represent two of the Council's main functions: sanctions and maintaining peace. We encourage you to use the background guide as a starting point in your research and explore further your Member State's stance on both issues.

I wish you all the best as you prepare for the conference and for this committee. Please do not hesitate to direct any questions or concerns towards me or the Director-General. I look forward to meeting you at the conference and best of luck!

Sincerely,

Andrew Dyadin, Assistant Director

Rohit Chandel, Director

Committee Overview

Overview

The Security Council (SC) is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (UN). Its first meeting was held on January 17, 1946 following the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations on October 24, 1945. The SC is delegated the specific task of maintaining international peace and security through determining the prevalence of threat or aggression. Its powers, which include establishing international sanctions, launching peacekeeping operations, creating criminal tribunals and authorizing military force are defined in Chapter V (Articles 23-32) of the Charter¹. The SC exists in continuous session in order to respond quickly to crises.

The Security Council has five permanent members based on the world powers that held victory following World War II- the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. In addition to these five permanent members, the SC includes 10 non-permanent members (elected by regional groups and confirmed by the General Assembly) whose memberships last for two years. Currently, these members are Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Morocco, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Rwanda and Togo.

Procedure

The Security Council differs from other committees in its voting procedure and power of veto. As outlined in Article 27 of the Charter, all decisions within the SC “shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members;”² in other committees, voting is by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. What is possibly the most unique procedural feature of the SC is its veto power, wielded by the five permanent members. Any of these five Member States may cast a negative vote on a “substantive” draft resolution, preventing its adoption. Veto power does not apply towards procedural votes, nor does abstention prevent a draft resolution from being adopted. There has been much criticism surrounding the power of veto in the SC, as a single negative vote by one permanent member is enough to strike down an entire resolution. It has often been the case that permanent members may use their veto power to overrule measures that are contrary to their individual national interests.

Outcome Documents

When taking action on a topic, the Security Council can issue resolutions similar to other committees. These resolutions are generally legally binding, though enforcement mechanisms may be insufficient. If the Security Council cannot reach consensus or a resolution is prevented from passing by a veto, they may choose to issue a Presidential Statement rather than a resolution. Presidential Statements are similar in content and format to resolutions but are not legally binding. They are adopted by consensus and are meant to apply political pressure.

Conclusion

¹ United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Art. 23-32. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>

² United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Art. 27. <http://www.un.orgt/en/documents/charter/>

With its authority to impose sanctions, authorize military action, launch peacekeeping operations, refer cases to the International Criminal Court, and establish criminal tribunals, the United Nations Security Council is often regarded as one of the most effective international institutions for maintaining peace and security.

I. Humanitarian Exemptions in Sanctioned Regimes

Introduction

A humanitarian exemption is defined as an exemption provided to certain humanitarian organizations and their subsidiaries which allows them to work in sanctioned regimes to deliver aid without the risk of contravening such sanctions.³ Such exemptions are often provided by the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) to enable humanitarian organizations to work in such a regime without violating any UN sanctions.⁴ While there are numerous sanctions placed by the SC, currently there are thirteen sanctioned regimes where potential humanitarian actors may be implicated:

- Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
- Central African Republic (CAR)
- Côte d'Ivoire
- Sudan
- South Sudan
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
- Iran
- Somalia/Eritrea
- Al-Qaida/Taliban
- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
- Yemen.⁵

These sanctions vary in severity, with the sanctions involving Al-Qaida being the largest as outlined in S/RES/2161 (2014), outlawing any financial transactions that deal with transportation and lodgings.⁶ These restrictions mean that even if a humanitarian organization is required to pay tolls, fees, or any other fiscal contribution to provide aid to civilians in need, they would still count as violations of the relevant SC resolution.⁷ In the case of Al-Qaida, for example, the cost of covering the travel of an individual to negotiate anything would directly contravene SC decisions.⁸

Few studies have been done to study the humanitarian aspect of targeted sanctions, however, working groups within the UN system have found that extensive sanctions, such as the ones in Libya in 2011, may affect the civilian population.⁹ It has also been noted by the High Level Review of UN Sanctions that owing to the fear of UN Sanctions, numerous humanitarian actors have seen their funding cut or blocked-off entirely.¹⁰ Supporters have argued that even if any of the aid does find its way to a sanctioned regime/entity, the impact will be minimal

³ King, K; Modirzadeh, N & Lewis, D (2016). *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U. N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*. Harvard Law School.

http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2016/04/Understanding_Humanitarian_Exemptions_April_2016.pdf

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ UNSC, *Resolution 2161 (2014)*, 2014. [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2161\(2014\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2161(2014))

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ King, K; Modirzadeh, N & Lewis, D (2016). *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U. N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*. Harvard Law School.

http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2016/04/Understanding_Humanitarian_Exemptions_April_2016.pdf

⁹ Working Group 3, High Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015.

http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_WG3_report_final.19.1.15.pdf

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

in the broader context.¹¹ However, opponents argue that creating more of these exemptions will lead to loopholes whereby money/resources could be funneled into sanctioned regimes/entities.¹² As can be seen, there is a need for debate on this topic as the number of sanctions increase and new methods to get around these sanctions are discovered.

International Framework and Committee-Specific Action

One of the first documents to talk about humanitarian exemptions implicitly was the *Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* of 1949.¹³ It asserted that parties to the convention shall allow the free passage of essential humanitarian supplies intended for civilians and that all efforts shall be made to forward such supplies as early as possible.¹⁴ The convention also mentioned that international humanitarian agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer aid to both parties in a conflict to care for the sick or wounded.¹⁵

Other UN bodies such as the General Assembly (GA) have also acknowledged the need for further discussion on the topic.¹⁶ As previously mentioned, there is no clearly defined set of rules for granting a humanitarian exemption due to the sanctions being regime-specific. Therefore, GA Resolution 60/1 of 16 September 2005 titled “2005 World Summit Outcome” called upon the SC, in conjunction with the Secretary-General (SG), to ensure that transparent procedures exist for granting humanitarian exemptions to individuals and entities on the sanctions list.¹⁷

Given the nature of these sanctions, some Member States have taken initiatives at the UN to explore various aspects of SC sanctions. One such initiative is the High-Level Review of United Nations Sanctions (HLR-UNS) which explored the effects of SC sanctions on the work of humanitarian actors in sanctioned regimes.¹⁸ The report published by this initiative, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, has identified key areas for improvement.¹⁹ The report encourages the Council to define sanction criteria and designations better to outline what clearly constitutes an exemption given that numerous humanitarian actors have a general lack of understanding as to when they are violating a UN sanction.²⁰ The report also explores other aspects such as over compliance, whereby humanitarian actors have seen a reduction in funding because of donor fears of facing action for violating UN sanctions.²¹ The report also contains numerous recommendations to the Council for addressing

¹¹ King, K; Modirzadeh, N & Lewis, D (2016). *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U. N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*. Harvard Law School.

http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2016/04/Understanding_Humanitarian_Exemptions_April_2016.pdf

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, 12 August 1949.

<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5>

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcomes (A/RES/60/1)*, 16 September 2005. <http://undocs.org/A/RES/60/1>

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Working Group 3, High Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015.

http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_WG3_report_final.19.1.15.pdf

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

the concerns of humanitarian organizations across the world, chiefly by conducting a thorough review of its practices.²²

Security Council resolutions themselves play the most crucial role when it comes to such exemptions. Through these resolutions, the Council usually outlines the exemptions that will be given to humanitarian actors in the field.²³ Lately, SC resolutions have begun to explicitly mention these exemptions as can be seen in the case of the recent SC resolution 2385 14 November 2017 titled “The Situation in Somalia”.²⁴ The resolution has acknowledged the humanitarian crisis in Somalia and has given exemptions, in context of financial transactions, to humanitarian actors working in the Member State.²⁵ This, however, is a time-sensitive exemption which will expire in November 2018 and the Council has requested the Emergency Relief Coordinator to provide a report by October 2018 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia to ensure the exemption was not used to deliver aid to the regime.²⁶

Key Issues

Defining what constitutes an exemption

There has always been a debate surrounding what exactly constitutes an exemption.²⁷ This vagueness has been criticized since some humanitarian actors may have inadvertently violated UN sanctions or they may see a shortage of the resources available to them when donors cut off aid in fear of violating sanctions.²⁸ Financial institutions sometimes curtail their services in Member States as a response to sanctions which may impede a humanitarian actor’s ability to deliver aid.²⁹ In 2016, banks froze fund transfers to aid agencies in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) which resulted in shipments containing aid supplies being withheld.³⁰ This caused extreme difficulties for the humanitarian actors working in the regime and hurt the delivery of much needed food aid.³¹

Some groups within the UN system have encouraged that while creating humanitarian exemptions, the Council should conduct an assessment of the regime which should include an examination of any humanitarian and socio-economic effects of sanctions in consultation with humanitarian actors.³² The Council should also consider adopting explicit exemptions for humanitarian actors to avoid any ambiguity.³³ Increasing awareness of the potential impact of such sanctions on humanitarian actors would also be beneficial.³⁴ As such, the Council and the

²² *Ibid.*

²³ United Nations Security Council, *The Situation in Somalia (S/RES/2385(2017))*, 14 November 2017. [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2385\(2017\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2385(2017))

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ King, K; Modirzadeh, N & Lewis, D (2016). *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U. N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*. Harvard Law School.

http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2016/04/Understanding_Humanitarian_Exemptions_April_2016.pdf

²⁸ Working Group 3, High Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015.

http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_WG3_report_final.19.1.15.pdf

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Murphy, T, *UN Sanctions on North Korea hurts aid efforts*, 2016. <http://www.humanosphere.org/world-politics/2016/07/u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-hurts-aid-efforts/>

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Working Group 3, High Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015.

http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_WG3_report_final.19.1.15.pdf

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

relevant Sanctions Committees should increase the usage of defined terms when it comes to implementing any sanction.³⁵ More nuanced debate is required in the Council to prevent any undesirable effects of these sanctions.

Preventing the abuse of humanitarian exemptions

There has been rising concern that humanitarian exemptions can be used as loopholes to enable entities to funnel support to sanctioned regimes by posing as humanitarian actors.³⁶ This argument also extends to the fact that sanctioned regimes themselves might create and use entities which masquerade as humanitarian actors working in that region.³⁷ Both these situations pose a security risk for the stakeholders involved.³⁸ In 2010, reports of UN aid being diverted to Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia surfaced which resulted in numerous Member States withholding their contributions.³⁹ This created an adverse situation in Somalia where large amounts of humanitarian aid were required but the funds had disappeared.⁴⁰

The Council has instituted various measures to keep the exemptions accountable, mostly by requesting periodic reports by various entities on the situation in the affected regime.⁴¹ Most SC resolutions that deal with such sanctions usually institute reporting mechanisms in place through various agencies.⁴² There have also been cases where the Council has granted exemptions only to other UN agencies operating in the field, such as in Somalia.⁴³ However, there is much that needs to be done in regard to this issue. Apart from reporting mechanisms, entities such as the HLR-UNS have repeatedly called for the strengthening of procedures that are used to define these exemptions.⁴⁴ HLR-UNS has also encouraged that the chair of relevant Sanctions Committee visit the regime, if possible, to ensure that such sanctions have their intended effect.⁴⁵

Case Study: Iraq

The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-81 and the eventual invasion of Kuwait were eventually responsible for the harsh impact of the sanctions that were placed on Iraq.⁴⁶ The Iran-Iraq War damaged several Iraqi cities and destroyed much of the country's oil production and refining infrastructure.⁴⁷ The collapsing economy and a huge debt due to the war eventually led to the invasion of Kuwait.⁴⁸ A series of resolutions were passed by the Council which asked Iraq to

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ King, K; Modirzadeh, N & Lewis, D (2016). *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U. N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*. Harvard Law School.

http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2016/04/Understanding_Humanitarian_Exemptions_April_2016.pdf

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Nebehay S., *Somalia funds dry up after aid diversion reports: UN*, 2010. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-conflict-un/exclusive-somalia-funds-dry-up-after-aid-diversion-report-u-n-idUSTRE62O29T20100325>

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ United Nations Security Council, *The Situation in Somalia (S/RES/2385(2017))*, 14 November 2017. [http://undocs.org/S/RES/2385\(2017\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2385(2017))

⁴² United Nations Security Council, *The Situation in the Central African Republic (S/RES/2387(2017))*, 15 November 2017.

[http://undocs.org/S/RES/2387\(2017\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/2387(2017))

⁴³ King, K; Modirzadeh, N & Lewis, D (2016). *Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions: U. N. Security Council Sanctions and Principled Humanitarian Action*. Harvard Law School.

http://blogs.harvard.edu/pilac/files/2016/04/Understanding_Humanitarian_Exemptions_April_2016.pdf

⁴⁴ Working Group 3, High Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, *UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging Challenges*, 2015.

http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_WG3_report_final.19.1.15.pdf

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Global Policy Forum, *Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the Future*.

<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/170/41947.html#note53>

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

withdraw from the country, followed by sanctions and the authorization of military action by Member States.⁴⁹ This was asserted in Security Council Resolution 678(1990) of 29th November 1990 which effectively allowed the use of force.⁵⁰

The Iraq Sanctions Committee reviewed proposed import contracts to determine the humanitarian exemptions for the sanctions imposed on Iraq.⁵¹ While food and medicines were usually given exemptions, but the committee blocked any shipment/contract when any party of the committee objected.⁵² As a result of the ambiguity in the sanctions, there were instances of food shipments being blocked on grounds of being commercial goods and medicines being blocked for alleged potential military use.⁵³ Such sanctions impeded the delivery of much needed aid and caused numerous other problems.⁵⁴

Conclusion

Overall, the humanitarian implications of sanctions are a topic that the Council must address. Numerous instances have shown that humanitarian actors have been negatively impacted by these sanctions and there is a need for nuanced debate to prevent such occurrences in the future. Sanctions play an important role in fulfilling the mandate of the Council, however, as illustrated through various examples numerous steps must be taken to ensure that civilian populations in need are not deprived of essential humanitarian aid.

Questions to Consider

- How can the Council work within its mandate to ensure that sanctions do not affect humanitarian actors?
- Why has the Council not incorporated the numerous recommendations made by various entities on the issue?
- What has the Council learnt from previous exemptions in sanctioned regimes and how can those lessons be used in the future?
- What should be the approach to this issue: revising existing sanctions or a complete overhaul of the sanctions process?

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Iraq (S/RES/678(1990))*, 29 November 1990. [http://undocs.org/S/RES/678\(1990\)](http://undocs.org/S/RES/678(1990))

⁵¹ Global Policy Forum, *Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the Future*.

<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/170/41947.html#note53>

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

II. Situation in Somalia

Introduction

During 1880s, the area around the Horn of Africa, which would later be known as Somalia, became of interest to the European powers during the scramble for Africa in late 19th century, a time when European states agreed to regulate the colonization of Africa following the Berlin conference in 1884-1885. During this time, Great Britain and Italy established their spheres of influence in Somalia, with Great Britain establishing British Somaliland following treaties with local chieftains in late 1880s around the areas of Zeila and Berbera, and Italy establishing the Italian Somaliland between 1897 and 1908.^{55,56} Zones of control shifted following the Second World War (1939-1945), but ultimately remained under the control of Great Britain and Italy until 1960.

In 1960, the former colonies of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland became known as the United Republic of Somalia after both entities achieved their independence.⁵⁷ After the assassination of Somalia's second president Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in 1969, Somali general Mohamed Siad Barre led a bloodless coup and served as a president of the newly renamed Somali Democratic Republic.⁵⁸ As this was happening during the Cold War, where United States and Soviet Union competed with each other for the influence of developing states, Siad Barre used the US-Soviet rivalry to advance his political gains, first siding with the Soviets in early 1970s and then switching allegiances to the United States in the late 1970s.⁵⁹

Historically, Somalia had traditional rivalries between several clans, including the Isaaq of the north, Ogadeni of the south, and Hawiye of central Somalia.⁶⁰ During his rule, Siad Barre constructed the inner core of his government from members of the Darood clan family.⁶¹ This, combined with increasingly authoritarian measures taken by Barre's administration to secure its hold on power, contributed to the civil war that erupted in late 1980s. This resulted in clan-based violence, with Siad Barre being supported by the Darood clan, and one of its most prominent armed opposition groups being the Hawiye clan being led by General Mohammed Farrah Aidede.^{62,63}

After Siad Barre fled the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu, in 1991, the country was thrown into chaos as it ceased to have effective governance, and conflicts between various militias that opposed Siad Barre's regime resulted in mass violence against civilians and those suspected to be supporters of Barre's regime.⁶⁴ The collapse of the central government in Somalia also had a negative impact on the rule of law, as the judiciary system virtually

⁵⁵ Zapata, Mollie, *Somalia: Colonialism to Independence to Dictatorship, 1840-1976*, 2012.

<https://enoughproject.org/blog/somalia-colonialism-independence-dictatorship-1840-1976>

⁵⁶ History World, *History of Somalia*. <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad20>

⁵⁷ Zapata, Mollie, *Somalia: Colonialism to Independence to Dictatorship, 1840-1976*, 2012.

<https://enoughproject.org/blog/somalia-colonialism-independence-dictatorship-1840-1976>

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Minority Rights Group International, *Somalia Overview*, 2011.

<https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/overview.pdf>

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Kapteijns, Lidwien, *Clan Cleansing in Somalia*, 2013. <https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/chapter/741992>

⁶⁴ Ibid

ceased to exist.⁶⁵ Instead, different judiciary systems filled in the vacuum, most notably the traditional *xeer* and *sharia* systems. During this time, approximately 400,000 people died due to food shortages and cholera outbreaks, and millions of Somalians were displaced in refugee camps in neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen.⁶⁶ Because central government and central security forces both ceased to exist, this time period was characterized by a collection of armed clan militias fighting over spoils.⁶⁷ During this stage of the civil conflict, the number of those killed amounts to tens of thousands killed and hundreds of thousands displaced.⁶⁸

Despite several UN peacekeeping missions in 1990s, Somalia continues to face a number of challenges in the 2000s including displaced Somalian refugees, resistance by Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda affiliate that continues to dominate many central and southern rural areas of Somalia, and political fragmentation as Somaliland and Puntland that are effectively autonomous from the central Somalian government.

International Framework and Committee-specific Action

Security Council

Due to the deteriorating conditions regarding peace and security in Somalia, the United Nations Security Council (SC) passed several resolutions in 1992 to stabilize the situation. The first resolution, Security Council Resolution of January 23rd, 1992 titled “Resolution 733 (1992)”, urged all parties to the conflict to stop hostilities, and decided that all states should immediately implement arms embargo on Somalia.⁶⁹ That resolution was followed by Security Council Resolution of April 24th, 1992 titled “Resolution 751 (1992)”, which led to the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).⁷⁰

First of the two United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM I was tasked with monitoring the ceasefire in Mogadishu, which is the capital and most populous city of Somalia, and to provide protection and security for the United Nations personnel, equipment, and supplies. The mandate was later expanded in Security Council Resolution of August 28th, 1992 titled “Resolution 775 (1992)”, where UNOSOM I was allowed to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centres across Somalia.⁷¹ UNOSOM I consisted of 50 military observers, 3,500 security personnel, up to 719 logistic support personnel, as well as approximately 200 international civilian staff.⁷² Despite the originally intended goals, any countrywide implementation of UNOSOM I proved to be almost

⁶⁵ United Nations Development Programme, 2016 Annual Report: Global Program on Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights for Sustaining Peace and Fostering Development, 2016. Pg. 27.

http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/library/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/rule-of-law-and-human-rights.html

⁶⁶ Le Sage, Andre, Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, July 2005. Pg. 22. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/20303/Somalia_stateless_justice.pdf

⁶⁷ Minority Rights Group International, Somalia Overview, 2011. <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/overview.pdf>

⁶⁸ Kapteijns, Lidwien, Clan Cleansing in Somalia, 2013. <https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/chapter/741992>

⁶⁹ Security Council, S/RES/733, 1992. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/733%20%281992%29&Area=RESOLUTION

⁷⁰ Security Council, S/RES/751, 1992. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/751%20%281992%29&Area=RESOLUTION

⁷¹ United Nations Security Council, S/RES/775, 1992. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chap%20VII%20SRES%20775.pdf>

⁷² Somalia-UNOSOM I, Mission Backgrounder. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unosomIbackgr2.html#two>

impossible, due to disagreements between Somali factions and hostilities that were directed against the UNOSOM I personnel, involving an incident where troops belonging to General Mohammed Farrah Aideed attacked the Mogadishu airport that was controlled by the UNOSOM forces.⁷³ In addition, due to absence of a central government capable of maintaining law and order, humanitarian workers experienced increased hijacking of vehicles and lootings of convoys and warehouses.⁷⁴ In light of this background, Security Council decided to broaden the mandate of the mission, and moved to establish UNOSOM II.

On March 26th 1993, SC established UNOSOM II in Security Council Resolution of March 26th, 1993 titled “Resolution 814 (1993)”, which took over from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Its mandate, which was presented in a report by the Secretary-General on March 3rd 1993, stated in paragraph 57 (b) that UNOSOM ought “to prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take appropriate action against any faction that violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostilities”.⁷⁵ The expansion of UNOSOM II mandate in terms of use of force was significant as it added more flexibility to UNOSOM II operations when compared to UNOSOM I. The expansion of the mandate, however, could not resolve the issue of civil strife, as UNOSOM II could neither impose peace nor coerce unwilling parties into it.⁷⁶ While the deployment of UNOSOM II contributed to reducing starvation deaths and conditions of famine in the country, like with the cholera epidemic in February 1994, and a general ceasefire between the factions.⁷⁷ However, the mission was unable to bring about national reconciliation between the opposing factions, something that prevented the continuation of UNOSOM II mandate beyond 1995.⁷⁸

By March 28th 1995, UNOSOM II was completely withdrawn from Somalia as a final stage in troop reduction, due to the inability by the mission to provide protection to the UN agencies, even within Mogadishu, caused by budget restrictions and military actions by the Somali factions.⁷⁹ While the United Nations was not able to set up internal institutions to sustain a well-functioning state, peacekeeping efforts succeeded most in the humanitarian field.⁸⁰ It was estimated that 250,000 lives were saved as a result of humanitarian efforts by various NGOs.⁸¹

Despite the end of direct peacekeeping military involvement in Somalia, SC passed a number of resolutions in the subsequent years. Security Council Resolution of November 14th, 2017 titled “Resolution 2385 (2017)” reaffirmed the military embargo on Somalia that existed since S/RES/733 (1992) first introduced the measures.⁸² While weapons can only be sold to the Somalian government for the development of the Somali National Security Forces, it has been noted that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has to improve its weapons management

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ United Nations Security Council, Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992), March 3rd 1993. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/121/56/IMG/N9312156.pdf?OpenElement>

⁷⁶ Somalia-UNOSOM II, Conclusion. <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm>

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Somalia-UNOSOM II, Summary. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom2backgr1.html>

⁸⁰ Somalia-UNOSOM II, Conclusion. <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm>

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Security Council, S/RES/2385, 2017. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2385.pdf

in order to prevent post distribution to any other party.⁸³ Another resolution, Security Council Resolution of November 7th, 2017 titled “Resolution 2383 (2017)”, which reemphasized the concerns over piracy off the coast of Somalia, and urged both Somalian authorities and Member States to coordinate with relevant international like the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol).⁸⁴

African Union

Following renewed hostilities in 2006, Security Council passed Security Council Resolution of February 20th, 2007 titled “Resolution 1744 (2007)”, which authorized the establishment of African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), tasked with protecting the TFG.⁸⁵ With an initial mandate being six months long, it has been renewed by SC until present time.⁸⁶ AMISOM has three components: Military, Police, and Civilian.⁸⁷ The Police component currently consists of 386 police officers, and are meant to provide mentoring and advisory support to the Somali Police Force (SPF). Over 4,000 Somali police officers have been trained by the AMISOM Police.⁸⁸ The Civilian component consists of Political, Humanitarian, Gender, Civil Affairs, Security and Safety, Public information and Administration Units.⁸⁹ This component is responsible for re-establishing functioning state institutions in Somalia, and is working closely with the FGS to achieve this.⁹⁰ Finally, AMISOM Military Component consists of 21,126 uniformed members, and currently covers center and south of Somalia.⁹¹ The component is mandated to stabilize the situation in the country, and create the necessary conditions for an eventual handover to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation.⁹² While the number also includes the police component, the military component includes 4,395 troops from Ethiopia and 6,223 troops from Uganda.⁹³

Following its deployment in Somalia, AMISOM collaborated closely with the Somalian government in various areas, like training of Somali national security forces (SNSF).⁹⁴ From July 24th to July 29th in 2017, a five-day joint AMISOM/Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) conference took place, with the aim of transitioning of security responsibilities from AMISOM to SNSF.⁹⁵ During the conference, both parties agreed to continue coordinated operations against Al Shabaab with the intent to “disrupt, degrade and defeat al Shabaab and other armed groups, protect population centres, open and secure main supply routes (MSRs) to allow Somalis to go

⁸³ United Nations, Extending Arms Embargoes on Somalia, Eritrea, Security Council Adopts Resolution 2385 (2017) by 11 votes in Favour, 4 Abstentions, November 14th 2017. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13065.doc.htm>

⁸⁴ Security Council, S/RES/2383, 2017. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2383.pdf

⁸⁵ Security Council, S/RES/1744, 2017. <http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Resolution%201744%20%282007%29.pdf>

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ AMISOM, Frequently Asked Questions. <http://amisom-au.org/frequently-asked-questions/>

⁸⁸ AMISOM, AMISOM Police. <http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/amisom-police/>

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⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ AMISOM, AMISOM Military Component. <http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/>

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ AMISOM, Frequently Asked Questions. <http://amisom-au.org/frequently-asked-questions/>

⁹⁴ AMISOM, Communique: On the Joint AMISOM/FGS Conference on transitioning Security Responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali National Security Forces, 2017. <http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Communique-Joint-AMISOM-FGS-conference.pdf>

⁹⁵ Ibid

about their lives freely, securely, and confidently”.⁹⁶ This indicates that Somalia is still in a dangerous position, and while some progress was observed with the transitioning of responsibilities to SNSF, FGS is still unable to have direct control over the country.

Case Study: Piracy off the coast of Somalia

Piracy off the Horn of Africa is not a new phenomenon, as its location intercepts important trade routes between the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, from where transport ships travelled either to the Mediterranean via the Red Sea or around Africa.⁹⁷ Since the events of the 1990s, the coast off the autonomous region of Puntland has become subject to renewed piracy. It has been suggested that piracy is motivated by a need to secure revenue to ensure survival, as the faltering and unstable economy since the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime led to little employment opportunities in the country.⁹⁸⁹⁹

Despite some hijackings occurring since 1990s, the overall number of attacks increased since 2005 and saw a dramatic increase in 2011, with the overall number of attempted and successful attacks rising to 237 that year.¹⁰⁰ One of possible reasons for the increase was suggested the positive feedback loop that Somali pirates caught themselves in: by successfully capturing ships and collecting ransoms, the pirate organizations accumulated wealth a portion of which was reinvested into pirate-related assets, like better vessels and improved weaponry.¹⁰¹ This professionalism, in turn, led to more young males turn to piracy.¹⁰²

Since the hijackings of 2010-2011, when 1,118 seafarers were held hostage and 24 killed, efforts have been made by the international community to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.¹⁰³ According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of December 10th, 1982, all states are responsible for cooperating in order to combat piracy that occurs outside the jurisdiction of any state.¹⁰⁴ Piracy is further defined in this convention under Article 101 as “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft”.¹⁰⁵

The Security Council is currently engaged in continuous efforts to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. Recent resolution S/RES/2383 (2017) recognized the efforts that the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) put in to prosecute the pirates, and has called upon the states to cooperate on the issue of hostage taking.¹⁰⁶ The resolution also encouraged Member States to continue to collaborate with Somalian authorities to

⁹⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷ Carlson, Andrew, Pirates of Puntland, Somalia, June 2009. <http://origins.osu.edu/article/pirates-puntland-somalia>

⁹⁸ Raunek, Causes of Maritime Piracy in Somalia Waters, 2016. Pg. 62. <https://www.marineinsight.com/marine-piracy-marine/causes-of-piracy-in-somalia-waters/>

⁹⁹ The Telegraph, Piracy and terrorism: why Somalia?, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/culture/captain-phillips-film/10367538/somali-piracy-reasons-causes.html>

¹⁰⁰ Lucas, Edward, Somalia’s “Pirate Cycle”: The Three Phases of Somali Piracy, 2013. <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1218&context=jss>

¹⁰¹ Ibid, pg. 61

¹⁰² Ibid, pg. 61

¹⁰³ Oceans beyond piracy, The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011, 2012. Pg. 21.

http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf

¹⁰⁴ UNCLOS, pg. 60.

¹⁰⁵ UNCLOS, pg. 61

¹⁰⁶ Security Council, S/RES/2383, 2017. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2383.pdf

continue the fight against piracy, while noting the “primary role of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia”.¹⁰⁷

Key Issues

Somaliland and Puntland

Republic of Somaliland is a self-declared independent state that borders Ethiopia. Having become a place of interest for the European states following the construction of the Suez Canal in Egypt between 1839-1869, Great Britain and France established their control in 1884 of what became known as British Somaliland and French Somaliland, with Italy gaining southern Somalia later in the mid-1880s.¹⁰⁸ Following the unification of the Italian and British territories on July 1st 1960, Somaliland became part of the unified Somalia.¹⁰⁹ Following the political collapse of the Somali central government in 1991, Somaliland’s leadership, which consisted largely of the Isaaq clan, proclaimed an independent state using the old British colonial borders.¹¹⁰¹¹¹ At the current moment, Somaliland is not recognized by the United Nations as an independent state, since it is believed to be a part of larger Somalia. The region meets the necessary requirements for statehood, which include a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.¹¹² Somaliland’s political independence presents a continuing challenge for the political unity of Somalia, and having met the requirements for becoming a United Nations Member State, it continues to act a source of tension between Somaliland and Somalia.

It is also worth noting the autonomous region of Puntland. Located to Somaliland’s west, Puntland is a region in the north of Somalia that declared itself to be autonomous in 1998.¹¹³ In contrast to Somaliland, Puntland does not claim to be independent. Instead, its leadership is working to rebuild the federal Somalia.¹¹⁴ Due to this, Puntland and Somaliland both claim territory that is overlapping, which results in occasional border clashes on the ground.¹¹⁵

The different dynamics of the political demands of these regions result in a situation where it is unclear what the future of Somalia’s statehood will look like. With Somaliland seeking international recognition of independence and Puntland’s want for a united but federal Somalia, fighting that occurs between the two of them constitutes another area of challenge to the political stability of greater Somalia.¹¹⁶

Al-Shabaab

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Hoehne, Markus Virgil, Between Somaliland and Puntland, Pg. 14. <http://riftvalley.net/publication/between-somaliland-and-puntland#.Wii0xUqnHIU>

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. Pg. 14

¹¹⁰ UNPO, Somaliland. <http://unpo.org/members/7916>

¹¹¹ Hoehne, Markus Virgil, Between Somaliland and Puntland, Pg. 14. <http://riftvalley.net/publication/between-somaliland-and-puntland#.Wii0xUqnHIU>

¹¹² UNPO, Somaliland. <http://unpo.org/members/7916>

¹¹³ BBC News, Puntland Profile. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14114727>

¹¹⁴ Hoehne, Markus Virgil, Between Somaliland and Puntland, Pg. 15. <http://riftvalley.net/publication/between-somaliland-and-puntland#.Wii0xUqnHIU>

¹¹⁵ Ibid. Pg. 39

¹¹⁶ World Atlas, What is a Puntland State of Somalia?, 2017. <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-puntland-state-of-somalia.html>

Al Shabaab, meaning “the Youth”, is a militant group with links to Al Qaida that has been fighting for the establishment of the Islamic state of Somalia.¹¹⁷ Its possible forerunner, Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI), gained a large base of support following the demise of Siad Barre in 1991, and has been joined forces with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) to capture the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu, in June 2006.¹¹⁸ Following the military intervention by the Ethiopian military in Somalia and the capture of Mogadishu in December 2006, Al-Shabaab moved relocated to south of the country and continued its operations there.¹¹⁹ Since that time, Al-Shabaab has been involved in suicide bombings and attacks on public locations like the attack on the Nairobi Mall in 2013 and Kampala during the screening of the 2010 FIFA World Cup Final.¹²⁰

Several measures have been taken to eliminate Al-Shabaab. AMISOM has been fighting against Al-Shabaab since AMISOM’s formation in 2007, and has succeeded in pushing Al-Shabaab forces out of port cities of Kismayo and Barawe.¹²¹ In addition, United States has carried out airstrikes against the group, with US President Donald Trump approving further escalation of operations against Al-Shabaab.¹²² Despite these successes by the AMISOM, Al-Shabaab continues a wide range of operations, widely believed to have carried out ambushes on AMISOM soldiers and terrorist bombings, with the largest bombing occurring in Mogadishu on October 16th 2017, where at least 300 people are believed to have been killed.¹²³

While direct military operations have an adverse impact on the group, the inability of central government to provide basic security is one of the ways in which Al-Shabaab continues to increase its ranks.¹²⁴ Another reason for group’s success in attracting support can be viewed with how it positions itself as the only legitimate representative of the Somali people. This, combined with corruption that has been associated with Mogadishu government and institutions in the past, led to Al-Shabaab receiving support from local clans and leaders.¹²⁵ Currently, it is estimated that the group has between seven to nine thousand members.¹²⁶

Rule of Law

Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somali judiciary system has faced significant challenges. As of 2005, after a decade of lack of central government, four different justice systems could be identified: formal judiciary structures that were created at international peace processes, the traditional clan-based system known as *xeer*, *sharia* courts in urban centres, and civil society and private-sector initiatives.¹²⁷

¹¹⁷ Council of Foreign Relations, Who is Al-Shabaab. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab>

¹¹⁸ Ibid

¹¹⁹ Ibid

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² BBC News, Who are Somalia’s Al-Shabab?. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689>

¹²³ The Guardian, Mogadishu truck bomb: 500 casualties in Somalia’s worst terrorist attack, 2017.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/15/truck-bomb-mogadishu-kills-people-somalia>

¹²⁴ BBC News, Who are Somalia’s Al-Shabab?. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689>

¹²⁵ Mellgard, Emily, What is Al-Shabaab?, 2017. <https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/what-al-shabaab>

¹²⁶ Council of Foreign Relations, Al-Shabaab in Somalia. <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/al-shabab-in-somalia>

Le Sage, Andre, Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, July 2005. Pg. 7. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/20303/Somalia_stateless_justice.pdf

As described by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, in his report titled “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies” on August 23rd 2004, rule of law is a “principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”¹²⁸

Some of the difficulties that were identified by the United Nations Development Programme were a lack of proper case recording and handling, absence of a central filing system, and incomplete files.¹²⁹ To improve the judiciary system, UNDP supported the implementation of first-ever Court Case Record Management System in the Banadir Region and sponsoring of remote courts that reached remote areas, something that resulted in the adjudication of 1,233 cases.¹³⁰

Overall, the judiciary system in Somalia has improved over the past two years, with peaceful transition of power occurring with the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo on February 8th 2017 serving as an indicator of increased political stability within the Federal Government of Somalia.¹³¹ However, because of the threat that Al-Shabaab still poses to government-controlled areas of the country, the formal judiciary system only operates in areas that are controlled by the government, something that weakens the overall reach of the court system in Somalia.

Refugees

The situation in Somalia displaced more than two million Somalians, with approximately 1.5 million being displaced internally, and led to nearly 900 thousand refugees inhabiting surrounding countries, with 308,700 in Kenya, 246,700 in Ethiopia, and 255,600 in Yemen.¹³² While attempts were made to assist the refugees, a number of factors is currently preventing full support as the country is currently facing challenges in the following areas: 1) insecurity and Al-Shabaab presence in the country, particularly in the central and southern regions, 2) lack of presence of government institutions in many areas, 3) limited access by humanitarian and development actors, 4) limited livelihood opportunities, 5) lack of basic services like health and education, 6) poor infrastructure, especially in the areas of housing, schools, and health facilities; and 7) low levels of investment in early recovery and development.¹³³ The situation was further exacerbated by the involvement of various foreign groups, like Ethiopia in 2006 and greater involvement of the African Union (AU) in the form of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).^{134 135}

¹²⁸ Security Council, S/2004/616. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement>

¹²⁹ United Nations Development Programme, 2016 Annual Report: Global Program on Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights for Sustaining Peace and Fostering Development, 2016. Pg. 27. http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/library/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/rule-of-law-and-human-rights.html

¹³⁰ Ibid. Pg. 27,41

¹³¹ Ibid. pg. 104

¹³² UNHCR, Somalia Situation 2017, 2017. Pg. 6. <http://www.unhcr.org/591ae0e17.pdf>

¹³³ Ibid

¹³⁴ Council of Foreign Relations, Who is Al-Shabaab. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab>

¹³⁵ Gaas and Gomsrud, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government at a Crossroads”. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2010. <https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=244&type=publicationfile>

Conclusion

The current situation in Somalia is complicated, as there are multiple factors that are involved. The political instability that ensued after the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in 1991 resulted in a prolonged conflict that lasted for over 20 years. Lack of central government and effective government institutions resulted in lack of support for the Somalian population, with many people either fleeing the conflict to neighboring countries, or joining organizations like Al-Shabaab and pirate groups. The collapse of the central government also resulted in several political entities emerging, like Puntland and Somaliland, which claim varying degrees of autonomy and established their own forms of government. Altogether, the overall situation has improved since 1991, but a lot of work still remains to be done.

Questions to consider

- Is it viable for the Security Council to resume direct peacekeeping efforts, like it has in the 1990s, and what are the implications surrounding it?
- Given the high threat that Al-Shabaab poses to Somalia and neighboring states, what are the ways in which the Security Council can either directly assist or coordinate the efforts between foreign entities like AMISOM and the FGS to better combat the threat?
- Given the disputed status of Somaliland and its border disputes with Puntland, how can Security Council collaborate with them to stabilize Somalia's political landscape, and counter threats coming from their territories?
- Given the challenges that piracy off the coast of Somalia presents to the international shipping lanes, what can Security Council do to continue dealing with this issue?

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